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Background
Due to enhancement in security problems for e-learning systems (Hecker 2008), it is 
essential that security concerns to be addressed in early stages of system development 
cycle (Jalal et  al. 2008). Various e-learning systems are designed which are based on 
formal techniques and provides threat modeling only in requirement phase but not in 
design and analysis phase of existing system. Due to this there will be no guarantee that 
design vulnerabilities of system can be removed easily.
A petri net is one of mathematical modeling language or tool used for description of 
discrete distributed systems. It is a directed bipartite graph in which the nodes represent 
transitions, places and directed arcs (Murata 1989). It is a graphical based model used 
for stepwise processes which includes choice, iterations, and executions. Petri nets per-
formed process analysis by using theory based on mathematical cases. Various types of 
petri nets are used to model behavior of system like colored petri nets (Houmb and Sall-
hammar 2012), timed petri nets and stochastic petri nets. Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) 
models distributed computing architectures and other software (Peterson 1977).
The proposed paper uses threat modeling for threat identification in system and cat-
egorizes those threats according to their categories (STRIDE) like spoofing identify, 
tampering data, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of 
privilege (Howard 2003). In proposed framework, new phases of threat modeling were 
added to fit with aspects and SPNs. Threat modeling offers various benefits such as (1) 
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easier for team members to understand their application in better way; (2) easier to 
identify faults in system; (3) complex design faults can be identified easily which was not 
able to retrieve earlier in easy way.
The main system functions are modeled using SPNs whereas the threat mitigations are 
modeled using aspect oriented stochastic petri nets (AOSPN) which we have developed 
in this proposed research. Our modified threat driven framework measures the correct-
ness, soundness and completeness of the SPN and AOSPN models (Dehlinger and Nalin 
2006). Threat analysis (risk assessment), disintegration correction assessment, mitiga-
tion (attenuation) correction assessment and mitigation (attenuation) assessment are 
introduced phases that were added to threat modeling framework. In risk analysis phase 
risk of threat is measured by assigning the likelihood of occurrence and impact to sys-
tem. Correctness assessment is measured using three main behavioral criteria of petri 
nets which are reachability, boundness and liveness. Mitigation (attenuation) assessment 
is calculated using a security metric that was adapted in this proposed work. Augmented 
metric is based on CVSS (Mell and Romanosky 2007) and proposed methods of Wang 
et al. (Wang et al. 2009). A modification in weight metric score was given to compute a 
quantitative score after applying the mitigations. On the basis of security metrics cal-
culation (Payne 2006), we are able to observe how effective the mitigations were which 
enable e-learning researchers to compare mitigation effectiveness.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. “Literature review” section describes related 
work. “Aspect oriented SPN model (AOSPN)” section deals with aspect oriented SPNs. 
“Modified threat driven modeling framework” section describes the modified proposed 
threat framework model. “Proposed security metric” section shows the extended secu-
rity metric and its calculations. “Case study” section deals with systematic case study, 
applying the threat driven framework and security metrics to specific question answer 
system and shows performance evaluation with respect to other frameworks. “Conclu-
sion” section concludes the paper.
Literature review
The proposed e-learning system mitigates the threats by performing threat modeling, 
aspect oriented development, usage of stochastic petri nets and security metric com-
putation. The threat modeling is used to identify the threats which require mitigation 
and how to mitigate them. The process starts by disintegrating the applications, then 
determining and rank threats. Adapt methodology to respond to threats, choose best 
possible way to mitigate the threats and finally choose the appropriate technologies for 
the identified techniques.
Dehlinger and Nalin (2006) developed an aspect oriented model which provides UML 
based security and includes security policies as an aspect while designing a secure sys-
tem. They have reviewed a security framework whose purpose is to provide the authors 
lessons derived from its design and use. They have verified the security of software using 
aspect oriented nets (Xu and Nygard 2006a, b). Their approach distinguished the soft-
ware modeling and threat mitigations which are modeled by petri nets and aspect ori-
ented nets simultaneously.
Sometimes the behavior of model not only depends on its structure but also on 
the timing. There is a requirement of stochastic petri nets (SPNs) which adds non 
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deterministic time through adjustable randomness of the transitions (Haas 2002). These 
nets are modeled on basis of exponential random distributions and their performance 
analysis is based upon Markov theory (Balogh and Turcáni 2011). SPNs offers numerous 
advantages over original petri nets like ease of functional behavior analysis and testing 
with aid of graphical format, describe concurrency, synchronizations and show correla-
tion among activities which describes the qualitative and quantitative properties of spec-
ified system like number of tokens firing from one place, how many tokens are expected 
to reach from one state to another at given time duration etc.
Over the last few years, developing methods to measure security loop holes is biggest 
challenge and concern among researchers. The NIST provided a paper as an overview 
of the security metrics area and looks at the possible possibilities of research that could 
be followed to advance the state of art (Jansen 2009). Some researchers distinguished 
between low level metrics and high level metrics for performing various estimations 
related to security. (Jensen 2008) created a tool SODAWeb which adapts and filter secu-
rity techniques by using various applications supported by tools. (Heyman et al. 2008) 
have presented method of using security patterns to combine security metrics.
In our proposed security model, we have considered Common Vulnerability Scor-
ing System (CVSS) (Mell and Romanosky 2007) which consists of three groups: Base, 
Temporal and Environmental. A numeric score has been produced by individual groups 
ranges from 0 to 10. A new approach was proposed by (Wang et al. 2009) to define soft-
ware security metrics based on vulnerabilities included in software systems and their 
impacts on quality of software. We have utilized the approach in e-learning based sys-
tems. It uses the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) and CVSS in their met-
ric definition and calculation. A complete comparative view of similarity and differences 
of proposed method with existing methods are given in Table 1.
Aspect oriented SPN model (AOSPN)
It incorporates the fundamental features of aspect oriented development. Aspects are 
the units that modularize the cross cutting concerns (cross cut the boundaries of tra-
ditional programming constructs). An aspect oriented program consists of a number 
of base modules and aspects that can be merged into an executable whole. AOSPN 
includes the basic concepts like join points, advices, pointcuts and introduction (Schau-
erhuber et al. 2006). An advice is contained by an aspect and is a piece of code that is 
inserted at one or more specific points of core concern. A join point is point in the exe-
cution where an advice is inserted. Join points may be transitions, predicates, and arcs 
in the SPN. A point cut is a language construct that designates a join point. Point cut 
defines whether a given join point matches according to defined criteria. An introduc-
tion net introduces new members to base modules. It allows aspects to modify the static 
structure of program.
In AOSPNs there are three types of pointcuts as described by: transition, predi-
cate and arc. A stochastic petri net-based aspect A is a structure 〈P, D, I〉 where P is 
set of pointcuts, D is a set of advice nets and I is a set of introduction nets. Processing 
timed transition pointcuts remove all the transitions selected by each transition point-
cuts and replace it with the corresponding introduction nets according to the advice 
specifications.
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Suppose there is a threat in the timed transition T1 in the stochastic petri net N1 in 
Fig. 1. We define the aspect as shown in Fig. 2 where the pointcut specifies the place of 
the threat, advice net described how the mitigation will be weaved and introduction net 
illustrates the mitigation. For clarity, the weaving mechanism assumes that a base net 
does not share names with SPNs in aspects. Aspects weaving with the base net results in 
a new stochastic petri net. It can further be weaved with other aspects that involve the 
original base net. The order in which aspects are applied to a base net is not significant.
AOSPN model alone cannot tackle the increasing challenge of lack of data, how a sys-
tem may react to certain security attacks although the chances of future security attacks 
are still unknown. There is little information known about the motivation and behaviour 
of attackers at this stage. To identify the attack trends report and vulnerabilities bulletin 
information in terms of CVSS is known. The benefit of CVSS is that it addresses the 
vulnerabilities directly and in collaboration with the vendors of the affected products. 
That is, CVSS tries to be specific and do not attempt to categorize attacks on a general 
basis nor does it provide a general model for estimating risk level. CVSS purely provides 
information about vulnerabilities on an operational level and leaves it to the vendors 
to add the information specific for their products and to the customers to interpret the 
information in the perspective of a particular Target of Evaluation. It is always better to 
use environmental metrics along with base and temporal metrics which we incorporated 
in our approach as given in CVSS to evaluate integrity, availability and confidentiality 
rather than productivity, reputation and privacy (Houmb and Franqueira 2009).
Modified threat driven modeling framework
The threat driven framework has been illustrated in Fig.  3 which is used to provide 
security in software based e-learning systems. This proposed framework comprises of 
Fig. 1 Stochastic petri net N1
Fig. 2 An aspect model with advice and introduction net. a Advice tcut. b Introduction net
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six steps which are Disintegrate application (decomposition), Disintegration correction 
assessment, Threat analysis (Threat identification, Identify Application vulnerability, and 
Risk assessment), Threat mitigation, Mitigation correction assessment and Mitigation 
assessment.
Our framework has proposed some modifications over the threat driven framework 
proposed by (Shrief et al. 2010) and traditional framework. Out of these steps Disinte-
grate application, Threat identification and Threat mitigation are taken from traditional 
framework and framework proposed by (Shrief et al. 2010) as shown in (Howard 2003), 
while remaining steps were customized according to their usage with SPNs (Murata 
1989; Peterson 1977; Haas 2002; Wang et al. 2009).
1. Disintegrate application: In this phase based on systems requirement the main mod-
ule will be modeled using SPNs. The existing models using UML can be easily trans-
ferred to SPNs. Further SPNs utilized for system functions as deliverables.
2. Disintegration correction assessment: In this phase the behavioral properties for 
SPNs will be tested using basic properties of nets like Reachability, boundness, live-
ness and safeness. Due to changes in behavioral properties if the SPN leads to dead-
lock or starvation then changes can be made by reverting back to previous phase.
3. Threat analysis: This phase is carried out in three steps: Threat identification, Iden-
tification of application vulnerability and risk assessment. After disintegration phase 
threat has been identified and modeled through SPNs. Threat has been categorized 
using STRIDE in which identified threats marked on the SPNs as pointcuts. In next 
step security vulnerabilities for individual applications in e-learning were identified. 
Fig. 3 Threat driven modeling framework
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Some of vulnerabilities are (authentication, authorization, input and data valida-
tion, configuration management, session management, auditing and logging etc.) for 
applications like virtual learning environment, student administration, mobile learn-
ing, virtual learning, certification etc. (Hayaati and Fan 2010). In last phase, the effect 
of threat can be identified on e-learning system using risk assessment. Threat matrix 
has been generated along with threats corresponding to vulnerabilities and prior-
itizes them on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence.
4. Threat mitigation: In this phase, the techniques to attenuate the threats are chosen. 
The deliverable of this phase is set of aspects describing the mitigations (introduction 
net) and how they will be inserted to original system with help of (advice nets) in 
specified pointcuts. If the new or unidentified threats occur after applying mitigation 
then they can be identified back in the previous phase i.e. threat analysis and then 
attenuated.
5. Mitigation correction assessment: In this phase if applying the mitigation leads to 
fault in the behavioral properties or due to incorrect mitigation then changes can be 
made by going back to previous phase and redesign the mitigations. After applying 
mitigation, if there is chance of likelihood of occurrence of risks then it can be redi-
rected back to risk assessments phase in threat analysis to minimize threat affect in 
nets.
6. Mitigation assessment: This is a recurrent phase which will be repeated before and 
after mitigation in which various security metrics will be applied to determine the 
potency of selected threat mitigations. The system threat level will be indicated 
by numeric values. If there is no changes in results obtained by numeric values in 
decreasing order then that appropriate mitigation were not chosen. So better mitiga-
tion techniques will be selected further by returning back to previous phases.
Proposed security metric
The proposed security metric is based on the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System) which is customization and modification of work done by Wang et al. The secu-
rity steps were customized so that they can be used with SPN models and they relied on 
the weakness of the e-learning system software. The proposed security metric process 
has been carried out in eight steps as follows:
1. Identification of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in applications.
2. Calculate severity for individual vulnerabilities.
3. Calculate the probability of vulnerability occurrence.
4. Calculate the probability of threat occurrence and risk assessment.
5. Calculate the percentage of each weakness.
6. Calculate the security metric.
7. Again calculate threats severity after mitigation.
8. Recalculate the security metric.
Various equations have been used for depiction of security metrics. The security met-
ric (SM(s)) is calculated by product of severity of weakness (Wn) and risk of correspond-
ing weakness (Pn) as shown in Eq. 1. Here n = 1, 2, 3…m.
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Now, Wn is defined as average base score of its k vulnerabilities, as shown in Eq. 2.
The percentage each representative weakness occurs in the overall weakness occur-
rences is used to calculate Pn as shown in Eq. 3.
where Rn is the frequency of occurrences for each representative weakness in the SPN as 
shown in Eq. 4, where K is the number of weaknesses and A is the sum of affected nodes 
in SPNs.
To make the value of SM(s) value to range from 0 to 10 is required to hold for Pn.
The severity of each weakness in e-learning systems after mitigation is recalculated as 
shown in Eq. 6. Here E denotes Exploitability, RL denotes Remediation Level and RC for 
Report Confidence which are important temporal metrics of CVSS. CR denotes Con-
fidentiality Requirement, IR denotes Integrity Requirement and AR denote Availability 
Requirement which are environmental metrics of CVSS.
For each mitigation weakness, if there exists certain vulnerabilities that still occurred 
are identified by recalculating Eq. 4. If the number of affected nodes become same com-
pared to the results obtained after applying mitigations then security metric has to be 
recalculated with help of Eq. 1. The proposed system intended to identify threats and 
their analysis in design and analysis phase, therefore the number of nodes affected in 
the SPN will be compromised due to threat occurrence is used. To re-compute the 




























Vi × E × RL× RC
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Case study
The proposed framework modules have been applied to case study on modeling of Ques-
tion–Answer system for Udutu based e-learning system. (Shrief et al. 2010) developed 
their threat framework and applied their framework on AI specific question answering 
system which is different from our question answering system.
Decompose application
The Question–Answer application in Udutu based system allows users to ask questions 
on Java Programming and system processes those questions (objective or subjective) 
and produces an answer. After user get authorized and authenticated by the system, he/
she could enter question on Java modules. The system responsibility is to check whether 
there exists direct answer to that question or not. If direct answer exists, then it can be 
retrieved from knowledge base and displayed. Otherwise, system process the same ques-
tion by searching the possible collective keywords to the nearest possible answers stored 
in knowledge base. From the available data, all possible answers have been created and 
from these answers select the best answer specified by user and finally display the appro-
priate answer.
The SPNs are best designed and modeled by Petri nets model which contain random 
events and perform processing of input data. The Petri net modeling is shown in Fig. 4 in 
which initial marking starts by one token in P0 that carries out different values through-
out the transition firings from one place to another.
For better understanding of above depicted model, meanings of places and transitions 
are shown in Table 2 respectively.
Fig. 4 Petri net model for question answering system
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Decomposition correction assessment
To check correctness assessment for e-learning based system three main behavioral 
properties are required: reachability, boundness and liveness. Reachability determines 
whether a state can be reachable from one to other (Haas 2002). SPNs are k bounded 
if they doesn’t contain more than k tokens in all reachable markings, including initial 
marking. Liveness determines that any state which is reachable can be fired without 
coming into deadlock situation. The reachability graph shows in Fig. 5 shows the differ-
ent markings and various states of SPNs that can be reached. This case study on e-learn-
ing based system is 1-bounded, live and also known as safe SPNs. The nodes in Fig. 5 
show different markings while arcs are labeled with transition names to show that mark-
ing is reached by firing of certain transitions.
Table 2 Place and transitions for question answer system
Place number Place description Transition 
number
Transition description
P0 User login T0 Authenticate
P1 Authenticated/authorized T1 Go to main page
P2 System ready state T2 Enter an objective question
P3 Objective question asked T3 Search if a direct objective answer exists
P4 Direct answer yes/no T4 Enter a subjective question
P5 Subjective question asked T5 Search if a direct subjective answer exists
P6 Direct answer yes/no T6 Searching the data in objective question 
knowledge base
P7 Data found T7 Create the answers
P8 Answer formed T8 Select from the answers
P9 Answer selected T9 Display an answer
P10 Response displayed T10 Getting response from answers
T11 Exit
T12 Decrypt answer formation decision and 
retrieve direct response for objective
T13 Decrypt answer formation decision and 
retrieve direct response for subjective
Fig. 5 Reachability graph for SPNs of question answer system
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Threat analysis
This module is divided into three phases as threat identification, application vulnerabil-
ity and risk assessment.
Identify threats
Various kinds of threats are used to be mitigated in present case study on e-learning 
system. First, when the user log into the system due to possibility of threats like net-
work eavesdropping, password guessing, cookie reply there is chance to lead authentica-
tion vulnerability. Second, when system starts searching to check whether direct answer 
exists or not, an attacker can tamper the data and change the response formation mode. 
Third, an elevation of privilege can occur if an unauthorized user tries to decrypt the 
answer formation decision and search for data or display direct response. Finally, while 
creating possible answers from data gathered, an attacker can tamper the data and influ-
ence answer creation.
After identification of threats the security vulnerabilities for different applications in 
e-learning were identified then finally the threat is being analyzed by risk assessment 
matrix (Hayaati and Fan 2010). Risk of each threat is measured by assigning the likeli-
hood of occurrence and impact to system. The risk evaluation done by using the risk 
evaluation grid proposed by (Barbeau 2005) Risks derived from threat analysis were clas-
sified in three main groups minor, major and critical which are decided by expert. The 
threat analysis result has been converted to the e-learning threats risk matrix as shown 
in Table 3.
Mitigate threats
Various types of threats have been identified and determined from categories of 
STRIDE. Here, as a sample the aspect for threat mitigation of tampering with data threat 
is provided. Some other threats can also be mitigated as shown as encircled in Fig. 6. 
The tampering with data threat is mitigated by encryption to prevent a code injection 
Table 3 Threat matrix
CR critical, MA major, MI minor, – not relevant
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attack to influence the answer creation (Wang et al. 2009). As shown in aspect of threat 
in Fig. 6, T19 is the transition which represents the encrypting system call arguments 
(Oyama 2006); P15 represents the state of system where all calls are encrypted so that no 
attack can happen and tamper the data; P14 is process where arguments are decrypted 
after processing and then encrypted again; P16 is the system state where answer forma-
tion gets completed; and T21 is the process of decrypting the system call arguments. 
Other threats like elevation of privilege threat will be mitigated by authorization; simi-
larly networking eavesdropping will be mitigated by authentication. For given aspect of 
data tampering threat the pointcut is T8; the advice net and introduction net will be
Security metric calculation (mitigation correction assessment)
Identify weakness and vulnerabilities
Some of the important weaknesses in e-learning system were identified like network 
eavesdropping; change response formation mode; influence answer creation and eleva-
tion of privilege.
Calculate severity for each vulnerability
The CVSS for each vulnerability should be calculated by assigning values to each of the 
six base metrics and creating the base vector as follows:
Fig. 6 Petri net model after threat mitigation
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1. Network eavesdropping: The base vector will be AV:[A]/AC:[H]/Au:[S]/C:[N]/I:[N]/
A:[P] = 1.5
2. Change response formation mode: The base vector will be AV: [A]/AC:[H]/Au:[S]/
C:[N]/I:[C]/A:[N] = 4.3.
3. Influence answer creation: The base vector will be AV:[A]/AC:[H]/Au:[S]/C:[C]/
I:[C]/A:[P] = 6.2
4. Elevation of privilege: The base vector will be AV:[A]/AC:[H]/Au:[S]/C:[C]/I:[N]/
A:[P] = 5.
Calculate the probability of vulnerability occurrence
The probability of vulnerability occurrence can be calculated by identifying the weak-
ness and vulnerabilities occurrence in the software. These calculations are computed or 
obtained from Eq. 4 (Rn). (1) Network eavesdropping: R1 = 1/20, (2) Change response 
formation mode: R2 = 1/20, (3) Influence answer creation: R3 = 1/20 + 1/20 = 1/10, (4) 
Elevation of privilege: R4 = 1/20 + 1/20 + 1/20 = 3/20.
Calculate the percentage of each weakness
The percentage of each weakness in the software is calculated from Eq.  2 (Wn) and 
Eq. 3 (Pn). (1) Network eavesdropping: P1 = R1/(R1 + R2 + R3 + R4) = 0.15, (2) Change 
response formation mode: P2 = R2/(R1 + R2 + R3 + R4) =  0.15, (3) Influence answer 
creation: P3  =  R3/(R1  +  R2  +  R3  +  R4)  =  0.28, (4) Elevation of privilege: P4  =  R4/
(R1 + R2 + R3 + R4) = 0.42.
Calculate security metric
The outputs of Eqs. 2 and 3 are require to substituted in Eq. 1 to obtain the security met-
ric value. The security metric score is calculated based on Eq. 1:
Recalculation of severity of threats after mitigation
For obtaining a comparative analysis between the state before and after mitigation the 
security metric SM(s) should be recomputed again. The resulting value obtained after 
computation should be less than the one computed before mitigations.
The CVSS temporal score should be calculated for each mitigated threat by assigning 
values to each of temporal metrics and created the temporal vector. The temporal score 
for the mitigations of four identified threats are:
1. Authentication: The temporal vector will be E:[F]/RL:[W]/RC:[C] = 1.35
2. Encrypt response decision: The temporal vector will be E:[POC]/RL:[W]/
RC:[UR] = 3.5
3. Encrypting system call arguments: The temporal vector will be E:[H]/RL:[W]/
RC:[C] = 5.9
4. Authorization: The temporal vector will be E:[F]/RL:[W]/RC:[C] = 4.5.
SM(s) =W1 × P1 +W2 × P2 +W3 × P3 +W4 × P4
= (1.5× 0.15+ 4.3× 0.15+ 6.2× 0.28+ 5× 0.42) = 4.7.
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We have considered only confidentiality requirement (CR), integrity requirement (IR) 
and availability requirement (AR) (Heyman et al. 2008) metrics for calculation of Wnnew.
The environment metrics for identified threats are:
1. Authentication: The required environmental vector will be CR:[M]/IR:[H]/AR:[H].
 Where M is 1.0, H is 1.51.
2. Encrypt response decision: The required environmental vector will be CR:[H]/IR:[L]/
AR:[M]
 Here M is 1.0, H is 1.51 and L is 0.5.
3. Encrypting system call arguments: The required environmental vector will be 
CR:[H]/IR:[H]/AR:[M].
4. Authorization: The required vector will be CR:[M]/IR:[H]/AR:[H].
From Eq. 6 the new obtained value for Wnnew need to be calculated which gives new 
value for severity of weakness after applying mitigations as:
Recalculate the security metric:
The security metric score SM(s) could be computed based on Eq. 1 after substituting 
Wnnew.
After evaluation of complete case study it was observed that before applying mitiga-
tions the threats determined in system and metric value was 4.7, whereas after apply-
ing the mitigations the threat mitigations the security metric was recomputed to check 
the effectiveness of the applied mitigations and scored metric value obtained was 2.33. 
It indicates that the mitigations were very effective in places where applied in system 
on basis of their occurrences. These security metric values indicate the effectiveness of 
applied mitigations and provide comparative analysis between different mitigations.
Performance evaluation
We have compared our framework with two existing threat frameworks 1) traditional 
framework (Howard 2003) and framework proposed by (Shrief et al. 2010). The tradi-
tional framework only considered base metrics whereas the (Shrief et al. 2010) consid-
ered base and temporal metrics for the measurement of severity of threat. Our proposed 
framework is based on base, temporal and environment metrics therefore it gives bet-
ter results as compared to the two existing frameworks. The comparative view of threat 

























= 0.15× 0.59+ 0.15× 4.63+ 0.28× 2.58+ 0.42× 1.97 = 2.33.
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Conclusion
This paper has shown an effective security threat driven modeling framework, modified 
security metric with usage of CVSS and AOSPN models. In threat modeling framework 
correction assessment has been involved, mitigation correctness to measure the behav-
ioral properties of SPNs and AOSPNs, and mitigation assessment to measure the mitiga-
tions effectiveness. These SPNs model weaved a point cut, advice nets and introduction 
nets into existing petri net system. Finally, security metric calculations were computed 
for SPNs with usage of CVSS and a new modified equation introduced by using base, 
temporal and environmental metrics to calculate the metric after mitigations to perform 
comparison among them.
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Table 4 Comparative view of various threat driven frameworks
Author Modeling Framework Equation
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assessment
6. Mitigation (Attenuation) assessment
After mitigation the severity 
is calculated only in terms 
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